The Rigor and Transparency Reporting Standard (RAT-RS) is a tool to improve the documentation of data use in Agent-Based Modelling. Following the development of reporting standards for models themselves, attention to empirical models has now reached a stage where these standards need to take equally effective account of data use (which until now has tended to be an afterthought to model description). It is particularly important that a standard should allow the reporting of the different uses to which data may be put (specification, calibration and validation), but also that it should be compatible with the integration of different kinds of data (for example statistical, qualitative, ethnographic and experimental) sometimes known as mixed methods research.

For the full details on the RAT-RS, please refer to the related publication “RAT-RS: A Reporting Standard for Improving the Documentation of Data Use in Agent-Based Modelling” (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13645579.2022.2049511).

Here we provide supplementary material for this article, consisting of a RAT-RS user guide and RAT-RS templates.

The goal of the AG-Innovation agent-based model is to explore and compare the effects of two alternative mechanisms of innovation development and diffusion (exogenous, linear and endogenous, non-linear) on emergent properties of food and income distribution and adoption rates of different innovations. The model also assesses the range of conditions under which these two alternative mechanisms would be effective in improving food security and income inequality outcomes. Our modelling questions were: i) How do cross-scalar social-ecological interactions within agricultural innovation systems affect system outcomes of food security and income inequality? ii) Do foreign aid-driven exogenous innovation perpetuate income inequality and food insecurity and if so, under which conditions? iii) Do community-driven endogenous innovations improve food security and income inequality and if so, under which conditions? The Ag-Innovation model is intended to serve as a thinking tool for for the development and testing of hypotheses, generating an understanding of the behavior of agricultural innovation systems, and identifying conditions under which alternated innovation mechanisms would improve food security and income inequality outcomes.

This is a simulation of an insurance market where the premium moves according to the balance between supply and demand. In this model, insurers set their supply with the aim of maximising their expected utility gain while operating under imperfect information about both customer demand and underlying risk distributions.

There are seven types of insurer strategies. One type follows a rational strategy within the bounds of imperfect information. The other six types also seek to maximise their utility gain, but base their market expectations on a chartist strategy. Under this strategy, market premium is extrapolated from trends based on past insurance prices. This is subdivided according to whether the insurer is trend following or a contrarian (counter-trend), and further depending on whether the trend is estimated from short-term, medium-term, or long-term data.

Customers are modelled as a whole and allocated between insurers according to available supply. Customer demand is calculated according to a logit choice model based on the expected utility gain of purchasing insurance for an average customer versus the expected utility gain of non-purchase.

This is an original model of (sub)culture diffusion.
It features a set of agents (dubbed “partygoers”) organized initially in clusters, having properties such as age and a chromosome of opinions about 6 different topics. The partygoers interact with a set of cultures (also having a set of opinions subsuming those of its members), in the sense of refractory or unhappy members of each setting about to find a new culture and trading information encoded in the genetic string (originally encoded as -1, 0, and 1, resp. a negative, neutral, and positive opinion about each of the 6 traits/aspects, e.g. the use of recreational drugs). There are 5 subcultures that both influence (through the aforementioned genetic operations of mutation and recombination of chromosomes simulating exchange of opinions) and are influenced by its members (since a group is a weighted average of the opinions and actions of its constituents). The objective of this feedback loop is to investigate under which conditions certain subculture sizes emerge, but the model is open to many other kinds of explorations as well.

Reconstruction of the original code M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen garbage can model, realized by means of Microsoft Office Excel 2010

This model simulates the emergence of a dual market structure from firm-level interaction. Firms are profit-seeking, and demand is represented by a unimodal distribution of consumers along a set of taste positions.

Agent-based version of the simple search and barter economy conceived by Peter Diamond in 1982. The model is also known as Coconut Model.

An artifcal stock market model that allows users to vary the number of risky assets as well as the network topology that investors forms in an attempt to understand the dynamics of the market.

This generic model simulates climate change adaptation in the form of resistance, accommodation, and retreat in coastal regions vulnerable to sea level rise and flooding. It tracks how population changes as households retreat to higher ground.

System Narrative
How do rebel groups control territory and engage with the local economy during civil war? Charles Tilly’s seminal War and State Making as Organized Crime (1985) posits that the process of waging war and providing governance resembles that of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups will extort local populations in order to gain power, and civilians or businesses will pay in order to ensure their own protection. As civil war research increasingly probes the mechanisms that fuel local disputes and the origination of violence, we develop an agent-based simulation model to explore the economic relationship of rebel groups with local populations, using extortion racket interactions to explain the dynamics of rebel fighting, their impact on the economy, and the importance of their economic base of support. This analysis provides insights for understanding the causes and byproducts of rebel competition in present-day conflicts, such as the cases of South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Model Description
The model defines two object types: RebelGroup and Enterprise. A RebelGroup is a group that competes for power in a system of anarchy, in which there is effectively no government control. An Enterprise is a local civilian-level actor that conducts business in this environment, whose objective is to make a profit. In this system, a RebelGroup may choose to extort money from Enterprises in order to support its fighting efforts. It can extract payments from an Enterprise, which fears for its safety if it does not pay. This adds some amount of money to the RebelGroup’s resources, and they can return to extort the same Enterprise again. The RebelGroup can also choose to loot the Enterprise instead. This results in gaining all of the Enterprise wealth, but prompts the individual Enterprise to flee, or leave the model. This reduces the available pool of Enterprises available to the RebelGroup for extortion. Following these interactions the RebelGroup can choose to AllocateWealth, or pay its rebel fighters. Depending on the value of its available resources, it can add more rebels or expel some of those which it already has, changing its size. It can also choose to expand over new territory, or effectively increase its number of potential extorting Enterprises. As a response to these dynamics, an Enterprise can choose to Report expansion to another RebelGroup, which results in fighting between the two groups. This system shows how, faced with economic choices, RebelGroups and Enterprises make decisions in war that impact conflict and violence outcomes.