This model simulates a forest ecosystem affected by human logging. We explore different kind of approaches and their possible consequences for the ecosystem. Loggers can either be responsible or irresponsible, they will either take care to cut trees or not. In turn their actions will have consequences on the quality of the soil, the atmosphere as well as their profit made from logging. In this model we see that even careful management cannot prevent the degradation of the forest ecosystem.

The model represents an archetypical fishery in a co-evolutionary social-ecological environment, capturing different dimensions of trust between fishers and fish buyers for the establishment and persistence of self-governance arrangements.

Indirect reciprocity can be evolved by the shared information among the people of small subgroups in the population.

This model simulates how collective self-organisation among individuals that manage irrigation resource collectively.

The model of Chinese and Western civilization patterns can help understand how civilizations formed, how they evolved by themselves, and the difference between the unity of China and the disunity of the Western. The previous research had examined historical phenomena about civilization patterns with subjective, static, local, and inductive methods. Therefore, we propose a general model of history dynamics for civilizations pattern, which contains both China and the West, to improve our understanding of civilization formation and the factors influencing the pattern of civilization. And at the same time, the model is used to find the boundary conditions of two different patterns.

PoliSEA represents a continuous policy process cycle, integrated with the dynamics of a fishery social-ecological system. The policy process in the model is represented by interactions between policymakers and interest groups and subsequent voting during which policymaker decide to increase or decrease the fishing quota for the next season. Policymakers’ positions can be influenced by lobbying of interest groups or interest group coalitions. The quota adopted through the policy process determines the amount of fish that can be harvested from the fish population during the season.

The Groundwater Commons Game synthesises and extends existing work on human cooperation and collective action, to elucidate possible determinants and pathways to regulatory compliance in groundwater systems globally.

Crowd dynamics have important applications in evacuation management systems relevant to organizing safer large scale gatherings. For crowd safety, it is very important to study the evolution of potential crowd behaviours by simulating the crowd evacuation process. Planning crowd control tasks by studying the impact of crowd behaviour evolution towards evacuation could mitigate the possibility of crowd disasters. During a typical emergency evacuation scenario, conflict among agents occurs when agents intend to move to the same location as a result of the interaction with their nearest neighbours. The effect of the agent response towards their neighbourhood is vital in order to understand the effect of variation of crowd behaviour on the whole environment. In this work, we model crowd motion subject to exit congestion under uncertainty conditions in a continuous space via computer simulations. We model best-response, risk-seeking, risk-averse and risk-neutral behaviours of agents via certain game theoretic notions. We perform computer simulations with heterogeneous populations in order to study the effect of the evolution of agent behaviours towards egress flow under threat conditions. Our simulation results show the relation between the local crowd pressure and the number of injured agents. We observe that when the proportion of agents in a population of risk-seeking agents is increased, the average crowd pressure, average local density and the number of injured agents increases. Besides that, based on our simulation results, we can infer that crowd disasters could be prevented if the agent population consists entirely of risk-averse and risk-neutral agents despite circumstances that lead to threats.

This code simulates individual-level, longitudinal substance use patterns that can be used to understand how cross-sectional U-shaped distributions of population substance use emerge. Each independent computational object transitions between two states: using a substance (State 1), or not using a substance (State 2). The simulation has two core components. Component 1: each object is assigned a unique risk factor transition probability and unique protective factor transition probability. Component 2: each object’s current decision to use or not use the substance is influenced by the object’s history of decisions (i.e., “path dependence”).

This model implements a Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma with the option to change whether agents interact deterministically or stochastically.