The model simulates the process of widespread diffusion of something due to popularity (i.e., bandwagon) within an organization.

This model uses preference rankings w.r.t. ethnic group compositions (e.g. at companies) and assigns ethnic agents to groups based on their rankings.

This model simulates the Hawk-Dove game as first described by John Maynard Smith, and further elaborated by Richard Dawkins in “The Selfish Gene”. In the game, two strategies, Hawks and Doves, compete against each other, and themselves, for reproductive benefits. A third strategy can be introduced, Retaliators, which act like either Hawks or Doves, depending on the context.

Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

This ABM re-implements and extends the simulation model of peer review described in Squazzoni & Gandelli (Squazzoni & Gandelli, 2013 - doi:10.18564/jasss.2128) (hereafter: ‘SG’). The SG model was originally developed for NetLogo and is also available in CoMSES at this link.
The purpose of the original SG model was to explore how different author and reviewer strategies would impact the outcome of a journal peer review system on an array of dimensions including peer review efficacy, efficiency and equality. In SG, reviewer evaluation consists of a continuous variable in the range [0,1], and this evaluation scale is the same for all reviewers. Our present extension to the SG model allows to explore the consequences of two more realistic assumptions on reviewer evaluation: (1) that the evaluation scale is discrete (e.g. like in a Likert scale); (2) that there may be differences among their interpretation of the grades of the evaluation scale (i.e. that the grade language is heterogeneous).

This model presents an autonomous, two-lane driving environment with a single lane-closure that can be toggled. The four driving scenarios - two baseline cases (based on the real-world) and two experimental setups - are as follows:

• Baseline-1 is where cars are not informed of the lane closure.
• Baseline-2 is where a Red Zone is marked wherein cars are informed of the lane closure ahead.
• Strategy-1 is where cars use a co-operative driving strategy - FAS. ^[1]
• Strategy-2 is a variant of Strategy-1 and uses comfortable deceleration values instead of the vehicle’s limit.
  …

We study cultural dissemination in the context of an Axelrod-like agent-based model describing the spread of cultural traits across a society, with an added element of social influence. This modification produces absorbing states exhibiting greater variation in number and size of distinct cultural regions compared to the original Axelrod model, and we identify the mechanism responsible for this amplification in heterogeneity. We develop several new metrics to quantitatively characterize the heterogeneity and geometric qualities of these absorbing states. Additionally, we examine the dynamical approach to absorbing states in both our Social Influence Model as well as the Axelrod Model, which not only yields interesting insights into the differences in behavior of the two models over time, but also provides a more comprehensive view into the behavior of Axelrod’s original model. The quantitative metrics introduced in this paper have broad potential applicability across a large variety of agent-based cultural dissemination models.

This model is a small extension (rectangular layout) of Joshua Epstein’s (2001) model on development of thoughtless conformity in an artificial society of agents.

This generic model simulates climate change adaptation in the form of resistance, accommodation, and retreat in coastal regions vulnerable to sea level rise and flooding. It tracks how population changes as households retreat to higher ground.

This is a simulation of an insurance market where the premium moves according to the balance between supply and demand. In this model, insurers set their supply with the aim of maximising their expected utility gain while operating under imperfect information about both customer demand and underlying risk distributions.

There are seven types of insurer strategies. One type follows a rational strategy within the bounds of imperfect information. The other six types also seek to maximise their utility gain, but base their market expectations on a chartist strategy. Under this strategy, market premium is extrapolated from trends based on past insurance prices. This is subdivided according to whether the insurer is trend following or a contrarian (counter-trend), and further depending on whether the trend is estimated from short-term, medium-term, or long-term data.

Customers are modelled as a whole and allocated between insurers according to available supply. Customer demand is calculated according to a logit choice model based on the expected utility gain of purchasing insurance for an average customer versus the expected utility gain of non-purchase.