CRESY-I stands for CREativity from a SYstems perspetive, Model I. This is the base model in a series designed to describe a systems approach to creativity in terms of variation, selection and retention (VSR) subprocesses.

A-KinGDom simulates the emergence of the social structure in a group of non-human primates. The model includes dominance and affiliative interactions which allow us to define four different attack and affiliative strategies.

This is the R code of the mathematical model used for verification. This code corresponds to equations 1-9, 15-53, 58-62, 69-70, and 72-75 given in the paper “A Mathematical Model of The Beer Game”.

The Regional Security Game is a iterated public goods game with punishement based on based on life sciences work by Boyd et al. (2003 ) and Hintze & Adami (2015 ), with modifications appropriate for an international relations setting. The game models a closed regional system in which states compete over the distribution of common security benefits. Drawing on recent work applying cultural evolutionary paradigms in the social sciences, states learn through imitation of successful strategies rather than making instrumentally rational choices. The model includes the option to fit empirical data to the model, with two case studies included: Europe in 1933 on the verge of war and south-east Asia in 2013.

A simulated approach for Personal Carbon Trading, for figuring out what effects it might have if it will be implemented in the real world. We use an artificial population with some empirical data from international literature and basic assumptions about heterogeneous energy demand. The model is not to be used as simulating the actual behavior of real populations, but a toy model to test the effects of differences in various factors such as number of agents, energy price, price of allowances, etc. It is important to adapt the model for specific countries as carbon footprint and energy demand determines the relative success of PCT.

The application of a smartphone application to register physical encounters between individuals is considered by public health authorities, as a means to reduce the number of infections in the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. The general idea is that continuous registration of all other smartphones in the vicinity of an individual’s smartphone potentially enables early warning of the owners of the other smartphones, in case the individual is tested positive as infected. Those other individuals can then go into isolation and be considered for testing. The purpose of the present simulation is to explore the potential effects of this application on frequencies of infection, isolation, and positive and negative infection test results.

This model simulates household water consumption patterns in an urban environment. Its current setup compares monthly water consumption data, and the results of a daily heuristic water demand model with the simulation results produced by household demographics that is fine tuned via some base demand model. It’s designed to estimate and analyze water demand based on various factors including household demographics, daily routines of residents (working, weekending, vacation patterns), weather conditions (temperature and precipitation), appliance usage patterns, seasonal variations, and special periods such as weekends and holidays. The model aims to help understand how different factors influence residential water consumption and can be used for water demand forecasting and management.

This is the code for the model described in an article in the International Journal of Microsimulation. Lawson (2013) ‘Modelling Household Spending Using a Random Assignment Scheme’, International Journal of Microsimulation, 6(2) Autumn 2013, 56-75.

This article presents an agent-based model of an Italian textile district where thousands of small firms specialize in particular phases of fabrics production. It reconstructs the web of communication between firms as they arrange production chains. In turn, production chains result in road traffic between the geographical areas on which the district extends. The reconstructed traffic exhibits a pattern that has been observed, but not foreseen, by policy makers.

System Narrative
How do rebel groups control territory and engage with the local economy during civil war? Charles Tilly’s seminal War and State Making as Organized Crime (1985) posits that the process of waging war and providing governance resembles that of a protection racket, in which aspiring governing groups will extort local populations in order to gain power, and civilians or businesses will pay in order to ensure their own protection. As civil war research increasingly probes the mechanisms that fuel local disputes and the origination of violence, we develop an agent-based simulation model to explore the economic relationship of rebel groups with local populations, using extortion racket interactions to explain the dynamics of rebel fighting, their impact on the economy, and the importance of their economic base of support. This analysis provides insights for understanding the causes and byproducts of rebel competition in present-day conflicts, such as the cases of South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Model Description
The model defines two object types: RebelGroup and Enterprise. A RebelGroup is a group that competes for power in a system of anarchy, in which there is effectively no government control. An Enterprise is a local civilian-level actor that conducts business in this environment, whose objective is to make a profit. In this system, a RebelGroup may choose to extort money from Enterprises in order to support its fighting efforts. It can extract payments from an Enterprise, which fears for its safety if it does not pay. This adds some amount of money to the RebelGroup’s resources, and they can return to extort the same Enterprise again. The RebelGroup can also choose to loot the Enterprise instead. This results in gaining all of the Enterprise wealth, but prompts the individual Enterprise to flee, or leave the model. This reduces the available pool of Enterprises available to the RebelGroup for extortion. Following these interactions the RebelGroup can choose to AllocateWealth, or pay its rebel fighters. Depending on the value of its available resources, it can add more rebels or expel some of those which it already has, changing its size. It can also choose to expand over new territory, or effectively increase its number of potential extorting Enterprises. As a response to these dynamics, an Enterprise can choose to Report expansion to another RebelGroup, which results in fighting between the two groups. This system shows how, faced with economic choices, RebelGroups and Enterprises make decisions in war that impact conflict and violence outcomes.