This model simulates a forest ecosystem affected by human logging. We explore different kind of approaches and their possible consequences for the ecosystem. Loggers can either be responsible or irresponsible, they will either take care to cut trees or not. In turn their actions will have consequences on the quality of the soil, the atmosphere as well as their profit made from logging. In this model we see that even careful management cannot prevent the degradation of the forest ecosystem.

This model introduces individual bias to the model of exploration and exploitation, simulates knowledge diffusion within organizations, aiming to investigate the effect of individual bias and other related factors on organizational objectivity.

Quality uncertainty and market failure: an interactive model to conduct classroom experiments

Discriminators who have limited tolerance for helping dissimilar others are necessary for the evolution of costly cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. Existing research reports that trust in

This model extends the bounded confidence model of Deffuant and Weisbuch. It introduces online contexts in which a person can deliver his or her opinion to several other persons. There are 2 additional parameters accessibility and connectivity.

We extend the Flache-Mäs model to incorporate the location and dyadic communication regime of the agents in the opinion formation process. We make spatially proximate agents more likely to interact with each other in a pairwise communication regime.

The model is based on the influence function of the Leviathan model (Deffuant, Carletti, Huet 2013 and Huet and Deffuant 2017). We aim at better explaining some patterns generated by this model, using a derived mathematical approximation of the evolution of the opinions averaged.

We consider agents having an opinion/esteem about each other and about themselves. During dyadic meetings, agents change their respective opinion about each other, and possibly about other agents they gossip about, with a noisy perception of the opinions of their interlocutor. Highly valued agents are more influential in such encounters.

We show that the inequality of reputations among agents have a negative effect on the opinions about the agents of low status.The mathematical analysis of the opinion dynamic shows that the lower the status of the agent, the more detrimental the interactions are for the opinions about this agent, especially when gossip is activated, while the interactions always tend to increase the opinions about agents of high status.

This a phenomenon-based model plan. Classroom in school are places when students are supposed to learn and the most often do. But things can go awry, the students can play up and that can result in an unruly class and learning can suffer. This model aims to look at how much students learn according to how good the teacher is a classroom control and how good he or she is at teaching per se.

An extension of Epstein’s (2002) model for civil violence and Fonoberova et al’s (2012) extension of Epstein’s model. Uses heterogeneous hardship values and dynamic legitimacy values. Models public funding decisions between police and social welfare.

The model explores the informational causes of polarization and bi-polarization of opinions in groups. To this end it expands the model of the Argument Communication Theory of Bi-polarization. The latter is an argument-based multi-agent model of opinion dynamics inspired by Persuasive Argument Theory. The original model can account for polarization as an outcome of pure informational influence, and reproduces bi-polarization effects by postulating an additional mechanism of homophilous selection of communication partners. The expanded model adds two dimensions: argument strength and more sophisticated protocols of informational influence (argument communication and opinion update).