STiMUS-HAI (Stigmergic–Mutualistic IMOI Model, Human-AI extension) is an agent-based model of teamwork in socio-technical systems where human and AI contributors collaborate through shared digital artefacts — wiki pages, code files, issue tickets, project cards, Scratch projects — represented as patches in a NetLogo world. It extends the human-only base model STiMUS v2.2, which established that two coordination mechanisms — stigmergy (indirect coordination through traces left in the environment) and mutualism (mutual benefit between contributors and the artefacts they tend) — can be decoupled: stigmergy decides where a contributor works, mutualism decides with what effort. STiMUS-HAI preserves this decoupling unchanged and adds two further theoretical questions: whether mixing AI agents into a human team distorts human coordination in ways that aggregate indicators hide, and whether AI’s cost to team outcomes depends on the type of work AI performs, not only on how much of it is present.

Two breeds of turtle — humans and ai-agents — follow identical target-selection, pheromone, and mutualism rules, so that any behavioural difference is attributable to team composition rather than a built-in advantage. The one designed asymmetry: AI agents never accumulate shared-mental-model and their motivation is fixed rather than adaptive. On top of this v3.0 baseline, v3.1 adds a task-type dimension to artefacts (“prediction” versus “judgment”, set via a judgment-share slider) that scales down AI edit-power specifically on judgment-requiring artefacts, and an ai-trust mechanic: humans build or lose trust in AI contributions based on the population-relative percentile rank of observed AI work quality (bottom-quartile work counts as an observed “error”), and that trust gates how much mutualistic benefit a human derives from continuing an AI’s work. Trust erodes quickly on a single error and recovers only after a streak of confirmed successes — an intentional asymmetry.

We used our model to test how different combinations of dominance interactions present in H. saltator could result in linear, despotic, or shared hierarchies.

The model studies the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous farmers. Based on their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperative farmers choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement.

This paper presents an agent-based model to study the dynamics of city-state systems in a constrained environment with limited space and resources. The model comprises three types of agents: city-states, villages, and battalions, where city-states, the primary decision-makers, can build villages for food production and recruit battalions for defense and aggression. In this setting, simulation results, generated through a multi-parameter grid sampling, suggest that risk-seeking strategies are more effective in high-cost scenarios, provided that the production rate is sufficiently high. Also, the model highlights the role of output productivity in defining which strategic preferences are successful in a long-term scenario, with higher outputs supporting more aggressive expansion and military actions, while resource limitations compel more conservative strategies focused on survival and resource conservation. Finally, the results suggest the existence of a non-linear effect of diminishing returns in strategic investments on successful strategies, emphasizing the need for careful resource allocation in a competitive environment.

A-KinGDom simulates the emergence of the social structure in a group of non-human primates. The model includes dominance and affiliative interactions which allow us to define four different attack and affiliative strategies.

This model is pertinent to our JASSS publication “Raising the Spectrum of Polarization: Generating Issue Alignment with a Weighted Balance Opinion Dynamics Model”. It shows how, based on the mechanisms of our Weighted Balance Theory (a development of Fritz Heider’s Cognitive Balance Theory), agents can self-organize in a multi-dimensional opinion space and form an emergent ideological spectrum. The degree of issue alignment and polarization realized by the model depends mainly on the agent-specific ‘equanimity parameter’ epsilon.

ICARUS is a multi-agent compliance inspection model (ICARUS - Inspecting Compliance to mAny RUleS). The model is applicable to environments where an inspection agency, via centrally coordinated inspections, examines compliance in organizations which must comply with multiple provisions (rules). The model (ICARUS) contains 3 types of agents: entities, inspection agency and inspectors / inspections. ICARUS describes a repeated, simultaneous, non-cooperative game of pure competition. Agents have imperfect, incomplete, asymmetric information. Entities in each move (tick) choose a pure strategy (comply/violate) for each rule, depending on their own subjective assessment of the probability of the inspection. The Inspection Agency carries out the given inspection strategy.

A more detailed description of the model is available in the .nlogo file.
Full description of the model (in line with the ODD+D protocol) and the analysis of the model (including verification, validation and sensitivity analysis) can be found in the attached documentation.

This spatially explicit agent-based model addresses how effective foraging radius (r_e) affects the effective size–and thus the equilibrium cultural diversity–of a structured population composed of central-place foraging groups.

The emergence of cooperation in human societies is often linked to environmental constraints, yet the specific conditions that promote cooperative behavior remain an open question. This study examines how resource unpredictability and spatial dispersion influence the evolution of cooperation using an agent-based model (ABM). Our simulations test the effects of rainfall variability and resource distribution on the survival of cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. The results show that cooperation is most likely to emerge when resources are patchy, widely spaced, and rainfall is unpredictable. In these environments, non-cooperators rapidly deplete local resources and face high mortality when forced to migrate between distant patches. In contrast, cooperators—who store and share resources—can better endure extended droughts and irregular resource availability. While rainfall stochasticity alone does not directly select for cooperation, its interaction with resource patchiness and spatial constraints creates conditions where cooperative strategies provide a survival advantage. These findings offer broader insights into how environmental uncertainty shapes social organization in resource-limited settings. By integrating ecological constraints into computational modeling, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the conditions that drive cooperation across diverse human and animal systems.

A logging agent builds roads based on the location of high-value hotspots, and cuts trees based on road access. A forest monitor sanctions the logger on observed infractions, reshaping the pattern of road development.