The O.R.E. (Opinions on Risky Events) model describes how a population of interacting individuals process information about a risk of natural catastrophe. The institutional information gives the official evaluation of the risk; the agents receive this communication, process it and also speak to each other processing further the information. The description of the algorithm (as it appears also in the paper) can be found in the attached file OREmodel_description.pdf.
The code (ORE_model.c), written in C, is commented. Also the datasets (inputFACEBOOK.txt and inputEMAILs.txt) of the real networks utilized with this model are available.

For any questions/requests, please write me at [email protected]

This is the replication of the experiment performed by Eerkens and Lipo (2005) to look at the effect of copying errors when specific traits are transferred from an individual to another.

This MAS simulates the traffic of Barcelona Eixample. Uses a centralized AI system in order to control the traffic lights. Car agents are reactive and have no awareness of the intelligence of the system. They (try to) avoid collisions.

This is the R code of the mathematical model that includes the decision making formulations for artificial agents. Plus, the code for graphical output is also added to the original code.

This model can be used to optimize intervention strategies for inspection services.

This is a simplified version of a Complex Model of Voter Turnout by Edmonds et al.(2014). It was developed to better understand the mechanisms at play on that complex model.

Project for the course “Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling”.

The NetLogo model implements an Opinion Dynamics model with different confidence distributions, inspired by the Bounded Confidence model presented by Hegselmann and Krause in 2002. Hegselmann and Krause used a model with uniform distribution of confidence, but one could imagine agents that are more confident in their own opinions than others. Confidence with triangular, semi-circular, and Gaussian distributions are implemented. Moreover, network structure is optional and can be taken into account in the agent’s confidence such that agents assign less confidence the further away from them other agents are.

SWIM is a simulation of water management, designed to study interactions among water managers and customers in Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona. The simulation can be used to study manager interaction in Phoenix, manager and customer messaging and water conservation in Tucson, and when coupled to the Water Balance Model (U New Hampshire), impacts of management and consumer choices on regional hydrology.

Publications:

Murphy, John T., Jonathan Ozik, Nicholson T. Collier, Mark Altaweel, Richard B. Lammers, Alexander A. Prusevich, Andrew Kliskey, and Lilian Alessa. “Simulating Regional Hydrology and Water Management: An Integrated Agent-Based Approach.” Winter Simulation Conference, Huntington Beach, CA, 2015.

Amidst the global trend of increasing market concentration, this paper examines the role of finance
in shaping it. Using Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), we analyze the impact of financial policies on market concentration
and its closely related variables: economic growth and labor income share. We extend the Keynes
meets Schumpeter (K+S) model by incorporating two critical assumptions that influence market concentration.
Policy experiments are conducted with a model validated against historical trends in South Korea. For policy
variables, the Debt-to-Sales Ratio (DSR) limit and interest rate are used as levers to regulate the quantity and
…

Subjective biases and errors systematically affect market equilibria, whether at the population level or in bilateral trading. Here, we consider the possibility that an agent engaged in bilateral trading is mistaken about her own valuation of the good she expects to trade, that has not been explicitly incorporated into the existing bilateral trade literature. Although it may sound paradoxical that a subjective private valuation is something an agent can be mistaken about, as it is up to her to fix it, we consider the case in which that agent, seller or buyer, consciously or not, given the structure of a market, a type of good, and a temporary lack of information, may arrive at an erroneous valuation. The typical context through which this possibility may arise is in relation with so-called experience goods, which are sold while all their intrinsic qualities are still unknown (such as untasted bottled fine wines). We model this “private misvaluation” phenomenon in our study. The agents may also be mistaken about how their exchange counterparties are themselves mistaken. Formally, they attribute a certain margin of error to the other agent, which can differ from the actual way that another agent misvalues the good under consideration. This can constitute the source of a second-order misvaluation. We model different attitudes and situations in which agents face unexpected signals from their counterparties and the manner and extent to which they revise their initial beliefs. We analyse and simulate numerically the consequences of first-order and second-order misvaluation on market equilibria.