This model tests whether local housing supply elasticity governs crash severity inside a single metropolitan housing market. Saiz (2010) established that across US metros, regions constrained by geography and regulation experience deeper boom-bust cycles than flexible ones. That finding is routinely applied downward to neighborhoods and ZIP codes as though the mechanism scaled without qualification.

The empirical record for the Washington DC and Northern Virginia region says it does not. Across 84 ZIP codes, measured supply elasticity ranges from 0.35 to 4.95 with a median of 1.21. The worst single-year price decline between 2007 and 2012 averaged 9.6 percent in constrained ZIP codes and 9.0 percent in flexible ones, a gap that cannot be distinguished from noise. Wide variation in the proposed cause, no meaningful separation in the proposed effect.

The model embeds households, houses and a metro-wide credit condition in the real ZIP geography of the region using three GIS layers and an empirical price panel. Local elasticity governs construction, exactly as theory predicts. Prices are driven by a shared macro drift schedule and, under the credit-amplified mode, by a leverage cycle with a financial accelerator and a deviation penalty. The design question is whether those shared forces are sufficient to override local supply differences at the sub-metropolitan scale.

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MOSAIC is an agent-based NetLogo model of decentralized mission coordination among heterogeneous robots operating under partial observability, limited energy, spatially variable risk, dynamic communication, and individual and cooperative task requirements. Robots discover tasks locally, exchange task information through temporary communication links, submit capability-, energy-, deadline-, and risk-aware bids, compete for individual contracts, and form temporary coalitions for cooperative tasks.

The model integrates decentralized auctions, greedy capability-based coalition formation, contract release and reassignment, four reward regimes, reputation, adaptive bidding strategies, failure traceability, and mission-, network-, information-, inequality-, and coalition-level metrics. It operates without a centralized mission planner or global combinatorial assignment solver.

Seven paired-seed BehaviorSpace experiments comprising 690 official simulation runs evaluate baseline mission viability, reward regimes, communication structure, capability heterogeneity, cooperative-task demand, reputation and adaptive strategies, and mission-incentive strength. The results indicate that structural coordination capacity—particularly information reach, capability compatibility, and feasible coalition construction—has a stronger effect on mission completion than increasing incentive intensity within the tested architecture and parameter ranges.

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This computational model is an agent-based model (ABM) developed to investigate how repeated failures of emerging niches accumulate and influence the trajectory of socio-technical transitions. Built in AnyLogic 8.7.11, the model simulates the dynamic interactions between a dominant regime and sequential niche entrants within a two-dimensional practice space. It models alignment, movement, and competition based on technological maturity and market penetration. The model utilizes a reinforcing feedback structure linking consumer support, output, resource accumulation, and capacity development (Physical and Institutional Capacity). A complete model specification following the ODD+D (Overview, Design concepts, Details, and Decision) protocol is included in the documentation.

This model is a minimal agent-based model (ABM) of green consumption and market tipping dynamics in a stylised two-firm economy. It is designed as an existence proof to illustrate how weak individual preferences, when combined with habit formation, social influence, and firm price adaptation, can generate non-linear transitions (tipping points) in market outcomes.

The economy consists of:
1) Two firms, each supplying a differentiated consumption bundle that differs in its fixed green share (one relatively greener, one less green).
2) Many households, each consuming a unit mass per period and allocating consumption between the two firms.

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Subjective biases and errors systematically affect market equilibria, whether at the population level or in bilateral trading. Here, we consider the possibility that an agent engaged in bilateral trading is mistaken about her own valuation of the good she expects to trade, that has not been explicitly incorporated into the existing bilateral trade literature. Although it may sound paradoxical that a subjective private valuation is something an agent can be mistaken about, as it is up to her to fix it, we consider the case in which that agent, seller or buyer, consciously or not, given the structure of a market, a type of good, and a temporary lack of information, may arrive at an erroneous valuation. The typical context through which this possibility may arise is in relation with so-called experience goods, which are sold while all their intrinsic qualities are still unknown (such as untasted bottled fine wines). We model this “private misvaluation” phenomenon in our study. The agents may also be mistaken about how their exchange counterparties are themselves mistaken. Formally, they attribute a certain margin of error to the other agent, which can differ from the actual way that another agent misvalues the good under consideration. This can constitute the source of a second-order misvaluation. We model different attitudes and situations in which agents face unexpected signals from their counterparties and the manner and extent to which they revise their initial beliefs. We analyse and simulate numerically the consequences of first-order and second-order misvaluation on market equilibria.

Negotiation plays a fundamental role in shaping human societies, underpinning conflict resolution, institutional design, and economic coordination. This article introduces E³-MAN, a novel multi-agent model for negotiation that integrates individual utility maximization with fairness and institutional legitimacy. Unlike classical approaches grounded solely in game theory, our model incorporates Bayesian opponent modeling, transfer learning from past negotiation domains, and fallback institutional rules to resolve deadlocks. Agents interact in dynamic environments characterized by strategic heterogeneity and asymmetric information, negotiating over multidimensional issues under time constraints. Through extensive simulation experiments, we compare E³-MAN against the Nash bargaining solution and equal-split baselines using key performance metrics: utilitarian efficiency, Nash social welfare, Jain fairness index, Gini coefficient, and institutional compliance. Results show that E³-MAN achieves near-optimal efficiency while significantly improving distributive equity and agreement stability. A legal application simulating multilateral labor arbitration demonstrates that institutional default rules foster more balanced outcomes and increase negotiation success rates from 58% to 98%. By combining computational intelligence with normative constraints, this work contributes to the growing field of socially aware autonomous agents. It offers a virtual laboratory for exploring how simple institutional interventions can enhance justice, cooperation, and robustness in complex socio-legal systems.

This agent-based model (ABM), developed in NetLogo and available on the COMSES repository, simulates a stylized, competitive electricity market to explore the effects of carbon pricing policies under conditions of technological innovation. Unlike traditional models that treat innovation as exogenous, this ABM incorporates endogenous innovation dynamics, allowing clean technology costs to evolve based on cumulative deployment (Wright’s Law) or time (Moore’s Law). Electricity generation companies act as agents, making investment decisions across coal, gas, wind, and solar PV technologies based on expected returns and market conditions. The model evaluates three policy scenarios—No Policy, Emissions Trading System (ETS), and Carbon Tax—within a merit-order market framework. It is partially empirically grounded, using real-world data for technology costs and emissions caps. By capturing emergent system behavior, this model offers a flexible and transparent tool for analyzing the transition to low-carbon electricity systems.

The model is an extension of: Carley K. (1991) “A theory of group stability”, American Sociological Review, vol. 56, pp. 331-354.

The original model from Carley (1991) works as follows:
- Agents know or ignore a series of knowledge facts;
- At each time step, each agent i choose a partner j to interact with at random, with a probability of choice proportional to the degree of knowledge facts they have in common.
- Agents interact synchronously. As such, interaction happens only if the partnert j is not already busy interacting with someone else.
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This agent-based model simulates the implementation of a Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) mechanism in a stylized urban environment inspired by Dublin. It explores how developer agents interact with land parcels under spatial zoning, conservation protections, and incentive-based policy rules. The model captures emergent outcomes such as compact growth, green and heritage zone preservation, and public cost-efficiency. Built in NetLogo, the model enables experimentation with variable FSI bonuses, developer behavior, and spatial alignment of sending/receiving zones. It is intended as a policy sandbox to test market-aligned planning tools under behavioral and spatial uncertainty.

This research aims to uncover the micro-mechanisms that drive the macro-level relationship between cultural tolerance and innovation. We focus on the indirect influence of minorities—specifically, workers with diverse domain expertise—within collaboration networks. We propose that minority influence from individuals with different expertise can serve as a key driver of organizational innovation, particularly in dynamic market environments, and that cultural tolerance is critical for enabling such minority-induced innovation. Our model demonstrates that seemingly conflicting empirical patterns between cultural tightness/looseness and innovation can emerge from the same underlying micro-mechanisms, depending on parameter values. A systematic simulation experiment revealed an optimal cultural configuration: a medium level of tolerance (t = 0.6) combined with low consistency (κ = 0.05) produced the fastest adaptation to abrupt market changes. These findings provide evidence that indirect minority influence is a core micro-mechanism linking cultural tolerance to innovation.